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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
KARL L. ROESCH, as to an undivided ) 
77.5% interest, and RIVER TERRACE ) 
ESTATES, INC., as to an undivided ) 
22.5% interest, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
DANIEL L. KLEMANN, an unmarried ) 
man; CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC.; ) 
and SHEA REALTORS, PLLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
DOCKET NO. 39836-2012 
Kootenai County Case 
No. CV-2011-3947 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai 
THE HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
John A. Finney 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a judicial foreclosure case. KARL L. ROESCH and 
RIVER TERRACE ESTATES, INC. (herein "Secured Parties") commenced 
this action to foreclose upon a Promissory Note secured by a Real 
Estate Mortgage granted by the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN upon 
real property in Kootenai County, Idaho. The Plaintiffs obtained 
a foreclosure decree entitled Judgment And Decree Of Sale entered 
August 30, 2011. The Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge, 
presiding, entered an Amended Judgment and Decree Of Foreclosure, 
on March 20, 2012, from which the Secured Parties appeal. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On or about May 16, 2011, KARL L. ROESCH and RIVER TERRACE 
ESTATES, INC. (herein "Secured Parties") commenced this judicial 
foreclosure action to foreclose upon a Promissory Note secured by 
a Real Estate Mortgage granted by the Defendant DANIEL L. KLEMANN 
upon real property in Kootenai County, Idaho. The action named 
as defendants DANIEL L. KLEMANN, the maker of the Promissory Note 
and mortgagor of the Real Estate Mortgage, and the holders of 
junior or inferior mortgages upon the real property, CORNERSTONE 
FINANCIAL, INC. and SHEA REALTORS, PLLC. 
The Complaint filed May 16, 2011 set forth the unpaid 
principal balance of the indebtedness, the interest paid to date, 
and the note rate of interest accruing. R. Pgs. 1-8, Complaint 
paragraph 11. The Complaint then set forth the relief requested 
for judicial foreclosure: An adjudication of the unpaid principal 
balance, the principal balance date, the interest rate accruing 
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through the judicial foreclosure sale, the costs and attorney 
fees of foreclosure, priority adjudication, the sale of the 
property, and a deficiency judgment if the debt is not satisfied. 
R. Pgs. 1-8, Complaint paragraphs 15, 19-24. 
Following service of process the Defendant SHEA REALTORS, 
PLLC stipulated to a priority adjudication, the Defendant 
CORNERSTONE FINANCIAL, INC. stipulated to a priority 
adjudication, and the Defendant KLEMANN was defaulted. On August 
30, 2011, the Judgment And Decree Of Sale was entered, which 
provided for a determination of the amounts due and accruing, the 
priority date and priority adjudication, for the judicial sale of 
the property pledged as security, and for proceedings to 
adjudicate a deficiency money judgment, if any. R. Pgs 11-15. A 
Writ of Execution For Sale Of Real Property was issued on 
September 13, 2011 by the District Court which was consistent 
with the pleadings the Complaint and the provisions of the 
Judgment And Decree Of Sale. R. Pgs 16-18. 
After encountering difficulties with the Kootenai County 
Sheriff in executing pursuant to the decree and the writ, the 
Secured Parties filed a Petition For Writ Of Mandamus To Compel 
Sheriff on December 14, 2011. R. Pgs 19-29. On January 31, 
2012, the Secured Parties and the Kootenai County Sheriff and the 
Kootenai County Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney were able to 
resolve the issue of executing pursuant to the decree and the 
writ (based upon similar proceedings to compel before a different 
District Court Judge for Kootenai County) and the Secured Parties 
withdrew the petition to compel. 
The District Court on January 31, 2011, rather than accept 
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the withdrawal of the petition, proceeded as to the "correct" 
rate of interest accruing between the adjudication to sell the 
property and the actual sale of the property. Transcript Pgs. 1-
22. The District Court then entered on March 14, 2011 what it 
entitled Memorandum Decision And Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
For A Writ Of Mandamus. R. Pgs. 35-60 (the petition had been 
withdrawn). The District Court then entered the Amended Judgment 
And Decree Of Sale on March 20, 2012. R. Pgs 61-65. 
The Secured Parties timely filed a Notice of Appeal as to 
the Amended Judgment And Decree Of Sale. R. Pgs. 66-69. This 
appeal follows. 
III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 30, 2011, the District Court entered a Judgment And 
Decree of Sale which determined the amount due and owing on a 
promissory note secured by real property as of a date certain plus 
interest still accruing on the note rate through the date of 
foreclosure sale. The interest accruing was at the note rate of 
15%. The Judgment And Decree of Sale further ordered that the 
foreclosure sale proceeds be applied to the note indebtedness. 
A Writ of Execution For Sale Of Real Property was issued 
September 13, 2011 which conformed to the decree. 
On March 20, 2012, the District Court entered an Amended 
Judgment And Decree Of Sale which amended the interest accruing 
between the date certain through the date of foreclosure sale. 
The note rate accrued on the unpaid principal balance. The 
interest rate used was the "statutory judgment" rate of 5.250% 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) and was applied to the 
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total amount due (principal, interest, and attorney fees and 
costs) . 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant's statement of the issue on appeal is: Did the 
District Court err in setting of the rate of interest in a 
foreclosure action accruing between the order of sale and the 
actual sheriff's sale date to be held? 
Alternatively the issue on appeal can be stated as: Does the 
note rate of interest accruing on a debt secured by real property 
continue through the date of the judicial sheriff's foreclosure 
sale of the property and the application of the proceeds of the 
sale to the debt? 
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. THE NOTE RATE OF INTEREST CONTINUES TO ACCRUE THROUGH THE 
DATE OF THE JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE SALE 
The issue on appeal in this case is the District Court's 
reduction of the rate of interest from the "note" rate to the 
"statutory judgment" rate from the entry of the order for sale 
until the actual foreclosure sale by the sheriff and the 
application of the proceeds of sale to the debt. The foreclosure 
process upon real property securing a debt, whether judicially or 
by power of sale, is well established. Generally, the secured 
party must first seek to recover by the sale of the security. The 
amount recovered at the sale or the fair market value, whichever 
is greater, is applied to the debt. The debt includes the 
principal and note rate of interest through the date of sale. 
Redemption periods apply to the foreclosed property. Redemption 
periods for non-judicial sales are prior to the sale held. 
Redemption periods for judicial sales are after the sale held. If 
the amount recovered from the foreclosure sale of the property 
does not satisfy the debt, a deficiency can be recovered as a 
personal money judgment. 
In the instant action, the Secured Parties held a note 
secured by a mortgage. Regarding the foreclosure of mortgage, 
Idaho Code § 6-101(1) provides in relevant part (emphasis added) 
as follows: 
There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt, or 
the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real 
estate which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter. In such action the court may, ~ 
its judgment, direct a sale of the incumbered property (or 
so much thereof as may be necessary) and the application of 
the proceeds of the sale to the payment of the costs of the 
court and the expenses of the sale, and the amount due to 
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the plaintiff; and sales of real estate under judgments of 
foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to redemption 
as in the case of sales under execution; (and if it appear 
from the sheriff's return that the proceeds are 
insufficient, and a balance still remains due, judgment can 
then be docketed for such balance against the defendant or 
defendants personally liable for the debt), and it becomes a 
lien on the real estate of such judgment debtor, as in other 
cases on which execution may be issued. 
The District Court failed to recognize that in a foreclosure, 
the Court adjudicates ("by its judgment") the indebtedness and 
orders a sale of the security from which to apply the sale 
proceeds to the indebtedness ("the amount due the plaintiff") . 
The indebtedness accrues interest pursuant to the debt instrument 
through sale. That is the "amount due the plaintiff" pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 6-101(1). The Court's order to sell does not covert 
the indebtedness to a final money judgment upon which the 
statutory judgment interest rate accrues. 
Following the foreclosure sale, if a deficiency exists, the 
Court then holds supplemental proceedings by which to adjudicate 
the deficiency money judgment. It is not until the deficiency is 
adjudicated and entered that the statutory "judgment interest" 
rate would apply. Idaho Code § 6-108 provides regarding 
deficiency judgments on a mortgage (emphasis added), as follows: 
No court in the state of Idaho shall have jurisdiction to 
enter a deficiency judgment in any case involving a 
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in any amount 
greater than the difference between the mortgage 
indebtedness, as determined by the decree, plus costs of 
foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable value of the 
mortgaged property, to be determined by the court in the 
decree upon the taking of evidence of such value. 
A foreclosure action on a mortgage involves not suing on a 
debt, but rather first collecting on the security. In the first 
appeal of Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Parsons, 116 Idaho 545, 
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549-50, (Ct. App. 1989), the Court recognized the nature of a 
mortgage and foreclosure process, and stated as follows: 
First, the law in Idaho authorizes a single form of action 
to collect a debt secured by a mortgage. I.C. § 6-101. To 
collect on the debt, the mortgage must be foreclosed. The 
creditor may not simply sue on the debt and collect by 
execution on the judgment. Quintana v. Anthony, 109 Idaho 
977, 979-80, 712 P.2d 678, 680-81 (Ct.App.1985). The bank 
correctly sought repayment of its $32,000 loan by the 
mortgage foreclosure. 
Second, Idaho law provides that "a mortgage is a lien upon 
everything that would pass by a grant or conveyance of the 
property." I.C. § 45-906. The bank produced evidence that 
its mortgage was properly recorded. Additionally, when the 
bank filed the complaint in foreclosure, it also filed a Lis 
Pendens under I.C. § 6-504, which gave notice to any 
subsequent purchaser that the foreclosure action was 
pending. See Suitts v. First Security Bank o£ Idaho, N.A., 
100 Idaho 555, 559, 602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979). The record does 
not indicate that any party with a properly recorded 
interest prior to the mortgage has contested this 
foreclosure. 
In the second appeal of Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. 
Parsons, 118 Idaho 324, 326-27, (Ct. App. 1990), the Court again 
recited the difference in the action and held that: 
Appellants cite Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 382 P.2d 
913 (1963), as authority that no lien existed upon the 
property subject to execution because the judgment was not 
recorded. However, we do not believe that Messenger is on 
point. It did not involve a foreclosure action and therefore 
has no application to the instant case. 
As noted, this case arises from a mortgage foreclosure 
action. A mortgage is a lien upon everything that would pass 
by grant or conveyance of the property. I.C. § 45-906. 
Pursuant to I.C. § 6-101, et seq., a mortgagee must first 
seek payment of a mortgage debt from the mortgaged property. 
Only if there is a deficiency, will the mortgagee be allowed 
to pursue the other assets of the mortgage debtor. If a 
deficiency judgment is obtained in due course by the 
mortgagee pursuant to I.C. § 6-108, that deficiency judgment 
would be subject to the recording provisions of I.C. § 10-
1110. In this way, the Idaho law protects property not 
subject to the mortgage unless the value of the mortgaged 
property is exhausted. Since the lien against the property 
existed by virtue of the recording of the mortgage, we hold 
that recording the "Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and 
Order of Sale" with the county recorder was not required in 
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order to proceed with the sheriff's sale, or issuance of the 
sheriff's certificate of sale and ultimately the sheriff's 
deed on foreclosure. 
The process of retaining jurisdiction to determine the fair 
market value for the purposes of a deficiency per I.C. § 6-108 
was set forth in First Nat. Bank of N. Idaho, N.A. v. Burgess, 
118 Idaho 627, 631, (Ct. App. 1990), as follows: 
The statute "requires determination of the fair market value 
of the mortgage property before a deficiency judgment can be 
awarded," Eastern Idaho Production Credit Assoc. v. 
Placerton, Inc., 100 Idaho 863, 870, 606 P.2d 967, 974 
(1980), and has been construed to require that the valuation 
should be that as it existed at the time of the entry of the 
original decree. Id., at 871, n. 4, 606 P.2d at 975, n. 4. 
However, nothing in the statute forbids the procedure 
utilized in this case by the district court. By retaining 
jurisdiction, the court reserved the right to take evidence 
on valuation at a later date and, if necessary, to amend the 
decree of foreclosure to include a determination of value, 
established as of the date of the original de'cree. Nothing 
about this procedure would appear to violate Burgess's right 
under the statute. Accordingly, we reject his contention 
that the district court erred in retaining jurisdiction to 
make a subsequent determination of value. 
The adjudication of indebtedness and the order of sale are not the 
final judgment in the matter. The District Court retains 
jurisdiction to determine value and deficiency. 
In regards to the foreclosure of a deed of trust, Idaho Code 
§ 45-1503 provides in relevant part (emphasis added) as follows: 
Where any transfer in trust of any estate in real property 
is hereafter made to secure the performance of such an 
obligation, a power of sale is hereby conferred upon the 
trustee to be exercised after a breach of the obligation for 
which such transfer is security, and a deed of trust 
executed in conformity with this act may be foreclosed by 
advertisement and sale in the manner hereinafter provided, 
or, at the option of beneficiary, by foreclosure as provided 
by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. 
In the event a Deed of Trust is judicially foreclosed upon, it is 
done so as a mortgage, with the application of Title 6, Chapter 1 
of the Idaho Code. 
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Similarly, for a deed of trust foreclosed non-judicially, 
Idaho Code § 45-1512, regarding a money judgment by an action 
seeking a balance after a trustee' sale, provides (emphasis added) 
as follows: 
At any time within 3 months after any sale under a deed of 
trust, as hereinbefore provided, a money judgment may be 
sought for the balance due upon the obligation for which 
such deed of trust was given as security, and in such action 
the plaintiff shall set forth in his complaint the entire 
amount of indebtedness which was secured by such deed of 
trust and the amount for which the same was sold and the 
fair market value at the date of sale, together with 
interest from such date of sale, costs of sale and 
attorney's fees. Before rendering judgment the court shall 
find the fair market value of the real property sold at the 
time of sale. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the entire amount of indebtedness 
due at the time of sale exceeds the fair market value at 
that time, with interest from date of sale, but in no event 
may the judgment exceed the difference between the amount 
for which such property was sold and the entire amount of 
the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust. 
In Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177 (Ct App. 1984), the 
Court ruled that in a judicial foreclosure proceeding on a deed 
of trust, the trial court uses the judicial mortgage foreclosure 
proceedings (I.C. § 6-101 and 6-108) in the determination of the 
deficiency judgment. That includes the application of the manner 
of determining the total amount of the indebtedness and the 
application of the sales proceeds or fair market value, to 
determine the deficiency due on the indebtedness, which becomes a 
personal money judgment. The case and analysis spoke in terms of 
applying the rate of interest on money due to payments made by a 
junior lienholder on a senior lien. The Court in Thompson ruled 
that: 
The decree of foreclosure provides the cut off date for 
fixing the amount of the mortgage indebtedness. "The decree 
directing a sale of the premises should find the exact 
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amount due on the mortgage and not leave this to be 
calculated by the office." FN2 L. JONES, LAW OF MORTGAGES OF 
REAL PROPERTY § 2042 at 493 (8~ ed. 1928) 
FN2. This, of course, does not preclude the decree from 
setting forth a per diem amount of interest which will 
accrue from the date of the decree to the date of sale. 
Also, it does not preclude adding costs of the 
foreclosure sale in computing the amount of any 
deficiency judgment. 
Thompson, 106 Idaho at 182-3. Nothing in that provision provides 
that the rate of interest between the decree directing a sale and 
the sale date is at the statutory judgment rate. At the time of 
Thompson, the statutory rate on money due but unpaid and the 
statutory judgment rate were both 8%. The Thompson case dealt 
with several issues, including the applicable rate of interest to 
accrue on the payments advanced on a senior lien (which was the 
8% "statutory" rate on money due). Having the same rate can 
cause confusion, but the District Court misunderstood the ruling. 
As the Thompson Court state, the interest "continues" to accrue 
until the deficiency judgment is entered, then the unpaid 
principal and the unpaid interest, etc. are all totaled for a 
person money judgment, which that total then accrues interest at 
the statutory judgment rate of interest. 
The Court that same year in Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 
886 (Ct. App. 1984) further highlighted and identified the 
distinction between money due prior to the adjudication of a 
final money judgment and the rate of interest on money due (but 
prior to adjudication), citing as follows: 
See also Thompson v. Kirsch, 106 Idaho 177, 677 P.2d 490 
(Ct.App.1984) (applying nonjudgment legal rate to 
obligations owed but not yet adjudicated, and judgment rate 
to such obligations after adjudication) . 
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In a foreclosure, the note rate (when set forth) or the 
"nonjudgment" legal rate (when there is no rate by the note) is 
applied through the foreclosure process. The "judgment" rate 
applies after adjudication of the deficiency (and atleast through 
the date of the foreclosure sale) . 
As set forth in Perkins v. Bundy, 42 Idaho 560, 561 (1926), 
"[a] decree of foreclosure of a mortgage is in no sense a 
personal judgment, and no personal judgment can be entered until 
after the foreclosure sale." This is because an adjudication of 
the amount due on an instrument of indebtedness for foreclosure 
is not a "judgment" upon which "judgment interest" then accrues. 
The adjudication of the amount due is necessary to hold the 
foreclosure sale. The deficiency, if any, is the personal 
judgment (upon which the statutory judgment interest rate then 
accrues) . 
In Isaak v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 907, 910 
(1991), the Court held that "[t]he correct date for determining 
the value of the [property sold at foreclosure sale] would have 
been the date when the trial court in a foreclosure case 
determined whether a deficiency judgment should be entered 
pursuant to I.C. § 6-108." The Court went on to describe the 
method for determining the deficiency, which includes interest 
before the sale date at the rate in the instrument of 
indebtedness. 
When the Court has considered the deficiency judgment 
proceedings pursuant to the deed of trust non-judicial process, 
(rather than the mortgage foreclosure statutes), the same result 
is found. In Wilhelm v. Johnston, 136 Idaho 145, 151 
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(2001) (citing Farber v. Howell, 111 Idaho 132, 135 (1986» the 
Court of Appeals explained the deficiency process and how the 
deficiency is calculated on a non-judicial foreclosure. The first 
step is to continue the interest on the debt at the note rate 
through the date of foreclosure sale. Then the sales proceeds or 
fair market value (whichever is greater) is applied. See also 
First National Bank of North Idaho v. Burgess, 118 Idaho 627 
(1990) cited above and American Mutual Building & Loan v. Kesler, 
64 Idaho 799 (1943) for general descriptions of the foreclosure 
process, including the deficiency and interest calculations. 
The District Court failed to recognize the applicable 
interest rate in a foreclosure action. Interest at the note rate 
continues to accrue on the unpaid principal balance through the 
foreclosure sale date. The District Court held that principal, 
interest, and attorney fees were totaled and that statutory 
judgment rate of interest applied to that total through the 
foreclosure sale date. The application of the statutory judgment 
rate arises in a foreclosure action only after the foreclosure 
sale and supplemental proceedings. In a foreclosure, a final 
personal money judgment (upon which the statutory judgment rate of 
interest would then accrue) is not entered until, if at all, 
deficiency proceedings are held after the foreclosure sale and 
application of the sale proceeds (or the fair market value, 
whichever is greater) to the debt. Those post sale proceedings 
and the calculation of any remaining unpaid debt continues at the 
note rate of interest. Not until the deficiency personal money 
judgment is entered does the statutory rate of interest then 
accrue. The final "judgment" is not the decree of sale, but 
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rather is the personal judgment based on deficiency, if needed. 
Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2) which provides for the post-
judgment statutory rate of interest on a personal money judgment 
is inapplicable to the foreclosure proceeding before the judicial 
foreclosure sale is held. Foreclosure sales are not the same 
thing as a real property execution sale seeking to recover on a 
lien which arises from a money judgment (whether based upon 
contract, tort, foreclosure deficiency judgment, or otherwise) . 
The District Court relies upon several cases and the District 
Court's prior decision in an unrelated group of foreclosure 
proceedings involving a separate common debtor. The prior 
decision by the District Court in the unrelated cases was not 
subjected to review upon appeal, based upon a bankruptcy discharge 
preventing a deficiency and a debt that greatly exceed value. 
The District Court primarily relies upon Bouten Const. Co. v. 
H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756 (1999) for its decision as to 
interest. That case dealt with a breach of construction contract 
(not a judicial foreclosure of a note secured by a mortgage). The 
language relied upon by the District Court dealt with prejudgment, 
interjudgment, and post judgment interest for damages awarded as 
increased construction costs. The crux of the ruling was that the 
judgment rate of interest in effect at the entry of the judgment 
remains unchanged until the judgment is paid. The rate does not 
fluctuate each year with the changes to rate. The Bouten case has 
nothing to do with the issue in the instant matter. The Bouten 
case does not involve any rate of interest applicable in a 
mortgage foreclosure whatsoever. The District Court's analysis is 
flawed. 
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II. THE SHERIFF IS REQUIRED TO HOLD THE FORECLOSURE SALE 
The duties and responsibility of the Sheriff's Department in 
proceeding on a foreclosure sale of real property is not 
discretionary. By the decree and the writ, the Sheriff's 
Department is ordered and required to "conduct a Sheriff's 
Foreclosure Sale for the sums due to the Plaintiff." The 
Plaintiff has a clear legal right to have the act performed; 
specifically the conduct of the sale with an application of the 
proceeds to the amount due on the indebtedness. In addition, the 
Sheriff's Department has a clear duty to act, and the action is 
ministerial in nature. There is no exercise of discretion 
necessary for the Sheriff's Department. 
As set forth in Blumauer-Frank Drug Co. v. Branstetter, 4 
Idaho 557 (1895), there is no discretion for the Sheriff's 
Department: 
We must not lose sight of the fact that process faire upon 
its face must be executed by the sheriff, upon its being 
placed in his hands. We hold the affidavit and notice to be 
process. No objection is made by the respondent from the 
form of the process. Therefore, the sheriff must execute it. 
The sheriff cannot be called upon, when he receives and 
execution, to sit in judgment upon the validity of the 
judgment. Neither can he, in this case, be called upon to 
sit in judgment on the validity of the mortgage. This is for 
the court, and not for the sheriff. 
In addition, the Sheriff's Department is liable for the failure to 
act. See generally Price v. Pace, 50 Idaho 353 (1931); Works v. 
Byrom, 22 Idaho 794 (1912). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Secured Parties are entitled to a decree of sale which 
adjudicates the amount due on the mortgage and provides for 
interest at the note rate through the date of sale (as well as 
attorney fees and costs of foreclosure and the sheriff's costs of 
sale). If the proceeds of sale do not satisfy the indebtedness, 
the District Court through supplemental proceedings shall then 
determine the fair market value and apply the greater of the fair 
market value or the proceeds of sale to the indebtedness to 
adjudicate the deficiency judgment. The deficiency judgment shall 
accrue interest at the statutory judgment rate. The Amended 
Judgment And Decree Of Sale entered by the District Court should 
be stricken, and the matter proceed to sale on the Judgment And 
Decree Of Sale previously entered in this matter. 
~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of July, 2012. 
t-7~·:±~ == 
J"oHN A. FINNEY V 
tINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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I hereby certify that on this l.fJ fr'-day of July, 2012, two 
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing, were served by 
deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were addressed to: 
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